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Comment
MARYLAND'S RULE ON WAIVER OF COUNSEL BY INACTION:
MAKING THE PERFECT THE ENEMY OF THE GOOD
I. INTRODUCTION
Under Maryland law, a criminal defendant has an absolute right
to counsel at trial.1 If she cannot afford legal representation, the State
will provide it.2 However, a defendant can waive this right to counsel
voluntarily3 or by inaction.4 In the latter case, a constructive waiver of
counsel is declared if a defendant repeatedly fails to make a good faith
effort to obtain a public defender.5 Maryland Rule 4-215 governs the
process of waiver of counsel.6 It originates from constitutional doc-
trine; hence, federal case law influences its applicability.7 Rule 4-215
specifies a two-step waiver process. A court must first provide the de-
fendant with a mandatory advisement of rights pursuant to section
(a).8 Appellate review of the proper dispensation of these advise-
ments is highly formalistic.9 The second step of the process is the
waiver inquiry as required by Rule 4 - 215(c) or (d). t ° This inquiry al-
lows a defendant to abate a waiver by inaction by giving the court a
"meritorious reason" for appearing unrepresented.1 ' Only after this
process is properly administered may a court declare that a defendant
waived counsel and proceed to trial.1 2
1. See Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 712 n.3, 481 A.2d 192, 197 n.3 (1984) (noting that
the right to counsel provisions of the Maryland Constitution are to be considered in pari
materia with the Sixth Amendment); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344(1963) (incorporating into the Fourteenth Amendment the right to counsel for all crimi-
nal defendants).
2. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45.
3. MD. R. 4-215(b).
4. MD. R. 4-215(c)-(d). Section (c) governs waiver by inaction for district court cases,
whereas section (d) governs waivers in circuit court.
5. See Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 126-27, 486 A.2d 163, 170 (1985) ("[A] defen-
dant may waive his right to counsel . . . by neglecting or refusing to obtain counsel.").
6. MD. R. 4-215.
7. See Leonard, 302 Md. at 119-24, 486 A.2d at 166-69 (discussing the interaction be-
tween federal and Maryland law on waiver of counsel).
8. MD. R. 4-215(a).
9. See Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 280, 523 A.2d 597, 607 (1987) (mandating that
Rule 4-215(a) requires "strict compliance").
10. MD. R. 4-215(c) & (d).
11. Id.
12. Id.
1376
2005] MARYLAND'S RULE ON WAIVER OF COUNSEL BY INACTION 1377
The Court of Appeals of Maryland demands strict compliance with
Rule 4-215 to promote three goals: simplicity of procedure, fairness in
administration, and the protection of a defendant's fundamental
rights.13 This Comment examines how, contrary to the goals men-
tioned above, the waiver process has become inefficient, unfair, and
unnecessarily formalistic.14 The process is inefficient in part because
appellate courts have construed the statutory language narrowly and
created additional procedural requirements that are often vague and
difficult to apply.15 They also have elevated form over substance to
reverse seemingly valid waiver determinations, thereby allowing virtu-
ally no valid waivers.16 In effect, appellate courts have judicially ve-
toed legislation by gradually construing Rule 4-215 in a narrow
fashion.1 7 As this Comment ultimately suggests, these judicial machi-
nations are unnecessary because a less rigid interpretation of the rule
will still protect a defendant's fundamental right to counsel. 8 This
Comment advocates that Maryland can achieve equilibrium between
fairness and efficiency by allowing substantial compliance with the
rule so long as it does not prejudice the defendant. It specifically sug-
gests that, at the very least, appellate courts should consider maintain-
ing the current construction of the rule without creating new
13. Parren, 309 Md. at 280, 523 A.2d at 607.
14. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 454, 735 A.2d 1003, 1021 (1999) (allowing
the defendant to appear unrepresented seven times before declaring a waiver of counsel by
inaction); Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407, 408-09, 663 A.2d 593, 594-95 (1995) (reversing a
conviction because the trial judge did not formally inform the defendant of his possible
punishment, even though the defendant said he understood the consequences because he
had recently been convicted of the same crime); Webb v. State, 144 Md. App. 729, 734, 800
A-2d 42, 45 (2002) (invalidating a waiver determination because the judge had the prose-
cutor read aloud the defendant's charges rather than personally dictating them to the
defendant).
15. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 381 Md. 348, 371, 849 A.2d 487, 500 (2004) (requiring
a trial judge to conduct a "personal interrogation" to determine that a defendant under-
stood mandatory advisements given via video or en masse); Johnson, 355 Md. at 461, 735
A.2d at 1025 (requiring the mandatory advisements to be given point-by-point at one
time).
16. See, e.g., Moten, 339 Md. at 408-09, 663 A.2d at 594-95 (invalidating a waiver determi-
nation because the defendant was not formally informed of the possible punishment upon
conviction in the precise manner prescribed by rule and despite evidence that the defen-
dant actually knew about the punishment); Parren, 309 Md. at 276, 523 A.2d at 605 (same).
17. It appears that Maryland appellate courts have upheld a finding of waiver by inac-
tion only once. Felder v. State, 106 Md. App. 642, 666 A.2d 872 (1995).
18. See Johnson, 355 Md. at 446-49, 464, 735 A.2d at 1018-19, 1027 (examining, but
ultimately declining to adopt, a harmless error analysis in evaluating waiver
determinations).
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requirements unless they are absolutely necessary to avert structural
injustice."
II. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Bases of the Mmyland Rule on Waiver of Counsel
The Maryland rule on waiver of counsel is rooted in two constitu-
tional rights that govern representation at trial: the right to counsel
and the right of self-representation. 20 The former is expressly embod-
ied in the Sixth Amendment, which states that "[i] n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence. ''2 ' The Supreme Court has construed this
language to guarantee criminal defendants the assistance of counsel
in both federal and state courts.22 Implicit in the right to counsel is
the correlative right to refuse the services of a lawyer.23 Without it,
the government might conceivably force counsel upon an unwilling
defendant.24 Over time, the Court recognized this implied right of
self-representation as an independent constitutional right under the
Sixth Amendment, thereby incorporating it into the Fourteenth
Amendment and applying it to the states. 25 To trigger this right, a
defendant must "knowingly and intelligently" waive the right to coun-
sel.26 The standard of proof necessary for a trial judge to approve
such a waiver depends on the particular facts of each case, including
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.27 In some
19. See infra notes 219-230 and accompanying text (discussing how a harmless error
analysis promotes efficiency and fairness without undermining a criminal defendant's fun-
damental rights).
20. Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 119, 486 A.2d 163, 166 (1985).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22. The Supreme Court's modern construction of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel finds its genesis in Powell v. Alabama, where the Court formally recognized this right as
"fundamental." 287 U.S. 45, 63, 68 (1932). The holding in Powell, however, limited the
right to counsel to capital cases in federal court, involving defendants of limited capacity.
Id. at 71. In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court expanded the right to counsel to all criminal
cases and incorporated it into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, making it
mandatory for the states. 372 U.S. 335, 342, 344 (1963).
23. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
24. Id.
25. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (holding that a state may not
force a criminal defendant to accept state-appointed counsel). In Johnson v. Zerbst, the
Court had previously allowed defendants to waive the right to counsel in federal court
thereby invoking the implied right of self-representation. 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938)
(holding that when the right to counsel is properly waived, the assistance of counsel is no
longer a necessary element of due process).
26. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (citing Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464-65).
27. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
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jurisdictions, a defendant's obstructionism may constitute a construc-
tive waiver of the right to counsel.28
Maryland law generally parallels federal law in this area. Article
21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states that "in all criminal
prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to be allowed counsel."
29
The Court of Appeals interprets this right to be in pari materia with
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,"° meaning that a valid waiver
of counsel in state court also must be made knowingly and intelli-
gently.3" Maryland, however, has chosen to impose requirements that
exceed this constitutional floor,3 2 and Rule 4-215 sets the applicable
standard. 3 It enumerates the actions a person must take to waive
counsel and the procedural requirements with which a trial court
must comply to sanction the waiver.34 Under Rule 4-215, a person can
waive counsel expressly 5 or by inaction.36 The latter is a two-step pro-
cess.37 To declare a valid waiver of counsel by inaction, a judge must
(1) provide the mandatory advisements of subsection (a)" and (2)
conduct a waiver inquiry specified under subsections (c) or (d)."
B. The Formalistic Application of the Mandatory Advisements
Maryland Rule 4-215(a) requires a trial court to (1) provide the
defendant with a copy of the charging document, containing notice of
the right to counsel; (2) inform the defendant of the right to, and
28. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46; United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 187 (9th
Cir. 1973). Several states also recognize this constructive waiver. See People v. Manson, 139
Cal. Rptr. 275, 302-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 953 (1978); Common-
wealth v. Chapman, 392 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); People v. Krom, 458
N.Y.S.2d 693, 698-99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), affd, 461 N.E.2d 276 (N.Y. 1984); Coleman v.
State, 617 P.2d 243, 245 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
29. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 21.
30. Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 712 n.3, 481 A.2d 192, 197 n.3 (1984).
31. Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 609, 536 A.2d 1149, 1161 (1988); Maus v. State, 311
Md. 85, 112, 532 A.2d 1066, 1079 (1987); Howell v. State, 293 Md. 232, 236, 443 A.2d 103,
105 (1982).
32. State v. Wischhusen, 342 Md. 530, 543 n.10, 677 A.2d 595, 601 n.10 (1996).
33. MD. R. 4-215. Maryland Rule 4-215 was derived from former Rules 723 and 726. Id.
34. Id.
35. MD. R. 4-215(b). A person also may discharge his or her counsel. MD. R. 4-215(e).
36. MD. R. 4-215(c)-(d). Section (c) pertains to the district court and section (d) to
the circuit court. See also Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 126-27, 486 A.2d 163, 170 (1985)
(finding that a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel by affirmatively refusing,
or neglecting, to obtain counsel).
37. Moreland v. State, 68 Md. App. 78, 82, 510 A.2d 261, 262-63 (1986).
38. MD. R. 4-215(a). The mandatory advisements are also referred to as the "checklist"
and the "litany." Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 426, 454, 735 A.2d 1003, 1006, 1021
(1999).
39. MD. R. 4-215(c) & (d).
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importance of, counsel; (3) advise the defendant of the nature of the
charges and their allowable penalties; (4) conduct a Rule 4-215(b)
waiver inquiry if the defendant expressly waives counsel; and (5) ad-
vise the defendant that if he appears unrepresented at trial, the court
could find that he waived counsel and proceed with the trial.4"
In Parten v. State, the Court of Appeals held that Rule 4-215(a)
demands strict compliance; substantial compliance will not suffice.41
Parren involved a waiver of counsel made expressly rather than by inac-
tion.42 It is nonetheless instructive because an express waiver of coun-
sel under Rule 4-215(b) requires a similar bipartite process, the first
step of which is identical to that of a waiver by inaction.4" That is, a
court must properly advise the defendant pursuant to Rule 4-215(a)
before counsel can be voluntarily discharged or waived. The defend-
ants in Parren chose to voluntarily waive counsel and represent them-
selves at a criminal trial that resulted in their conviction." The Court
of Appeals reviewed the waiver determination, which was affirmed by
the Court of Special Appeals, and held that the trial court complied
with every statutory requirement except subsection (a) (3) .15 Specifi-
cally, the judge failed to formally advise the defendants of the penal-
ties associated with their alleged crimes.46  The Parten court
recognized that the defendants probably had actual, if not construc-
tive, knowledge of the penalties because, during pre-trial proceedings,
the defendants cited the sections of the Maryland Code that con-
tained them.47 The Court of Appeals nevertheless reversed their con-
victions because the trial judge did not strictly comply with Rule 4-
215 (a).48 Strict compliance, the court declared, is necessary to ensure
simplicity of procedure, fairness in administration, and the protection
of a defendant's fundamental rights.4"
The Court of Appeals reaffirmed Parren in Moten v. State, a factu-
ally similar case. As in Parren, the defendant in Moten discharged his
assigned counsel and proceeded pro se to a seemingly preordained
trial conviction.5 ° Once again, it was undisputed that the judge failed
40. MD. R. 4 -215(a).
41. 309 Md. 260, 280, 523 A.2d 597, 607 (1987).
42. Id. at 266, 523 A.2d at 600.
43. See MD. R. 4-215(b) ("If the file or docket does not reflect compliance with section
(a) of this Rule, the court shall comply with that section as part of the waiver inquiry.").
44. Parren, 309 Md. at 267, 523 A.2d at 600.
45. Id. at 266, 282, 523 A.2d at 600, 608.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 276, 523 A.2d at 605.
48. Id. at 280, 523 A.2d at 607.
49. Id.
50. 339 Md. 407, 408-09, 663 A.2d 593, 594 (1995).
1380 [Voi-. 64:1376
2005] MARYLAND'S RULE ON WAIVER OF COUNSEL BY INACTION 1381
to inform the defendant of the relevant penalties as required by sub-
section (a) (3) .51 To the Court of Special Appeals, however, the omis-
sion was harmless error because there was convincing evidence that
the defendant knew his possible punishment.52 Moten had been con-
victed of the same crime two months earlier, and in the present case,
when the trial judge asked him if he understood the consequences of
a guilty verdict, he answered yes.53 Reversing the intermediate court's
decision, the Court of Appeals declined to sanction a harmless error
analysis and upheld Parren without modification, ordering a new trial
for the defendant.54 Two years later, in Okon v. State,55 the Court of
Appeals reinforced Parren and Moten in a one-page opinion.56
The Court of Appeals extended the doctrine of strict compliance
to waivers of counsel by inaction in Johnson v. State.5 ' The trial judge
in that case held that the defendant waived counsel by inaction after
appearing unrepresented seven times.58 The Court of Special Appeals
found substantial compliance with Rule 4-215(a) because three docu-
ments showed that the defendant had been given virtually all the
mandatory advisements. 59 First, the bail review docket, signed by the
district court judge, indicated that the defendant received a copy of
the charging document, was informed of the right to and importance
of counsel, and was referred to the public defender.60 Second, the
"Initial Appearance Report," signed by both a district court commis-
sioner and the defendant, contained each charge and their allowable
penalties.61 Third, the "Notice of Advice of Right to Counsel," signed
by both the commissioner and the defendant, warned the defendant
that failure to obtain a public defender may result in a waiver of coun-
sel.6 2 The Court of Appeals agreed that there was substantial compli-
ance, but it nevertheless vacated the judgment because Rule 4-215(a)
demands strict compliance.63 The court identified several procedural
discrepancies that left the waiver proceeding wanting.6 4 A district
51. Id. at 409, 663 A.2d at 594.
52. Id., 663 A.2d at 595.
53. Id. at 408-09, 663 A.2d at 594-95.
54. Id. at 409, 663 A.2d at 595.
55. 346 Md. 249, 696 A.2d 441 (1997).
56. Id. at 249, 696 A.2d at 442.
57. 355 Md. 420, 446, 735 A.2d 1003, 1017 (1999).
58. Id. at 454, 735 A.2d at 1021.
59. Id. at 425-26, 435, 735 A.2d at 1006, 1011.
60. Id. at 426, 735 A.2d at 1006.
61. Id.
62. I&
63. Id. at 452-53, 735 A.2d at 1020-21.
64. See id. at 453-64, 735 A.2d at 1021-25.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
court commissioner rather than ajudge signed the Initial Appearance
Report, which covered all five mandatory advisements, as well as the
Notice of Advice of Right to Counsel, which included advisements (2)
and (5) .65 The Johnson court concluded that to strictly comply with
Rule 4-215(a), a trial judge must go through the mandatory advise-
ments with the defendant "point-by-point" and not in a "piecemeal"
fashion.66
The Court of Special Appeals in Webb v. State emphasized that if a
judge does not personally dispense each and every mandatory advise-
ment, the subsequent waiver determination is ipso facto invalid.6"
The trial judge in that case attempted to comply with Rule 4-215(a) by
going through the mandatory advisements with the defendant.6 Sub-
section (3) requires that the defendant be advised of the nature of the
charges and the allowable penalties.69 To comply with this subsection,
the judge asked the defendant if he knew the charges he faced, and
he said yes. y° The judge then asked the defendant if he nevertheless
wanted the charges read to him, and he said yes.7 ' To meet this re-
quest, the judge directed the state's attorney to read aloud the charges
and their associated penalties.72 The defendant was then asked if he
understood the state's attorney's recitation, and he said he did.7" The
judge gave the remainder of the mandatory advisements in proper
fashion.7 4 Three months later, the defendant appeared in court for
trial without counsel and the judge declared a waiver by inaction.7 5
The Court of Special Appeals reversed this finding because the state's
attorney, rather than the judge informed the defendant about the rel-
evant charges.76
Recognizing the formalistic requirements of Rule 4-215(a), the
trial court system devised videotaped advisements to eliminate proce-
dural error. The validity of such a procedure was examined in Rich-
ardson v. State.7 7 The defendant in that case was given the mandatory
65. Id. at 455, 735 A.2d at 1022.
66. Id. at 461, 735 A.2d at 1025.
67. 144 Md. App. 729, 741, 800 A.2d 42, 49 (2002).
68. Id. at 734-35, 800 A.2d at 44-45.
69. MD. R. 4-215(a) (3).
70. Webb, 144 Md. App. at 734, 800 A.2d at 45.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 735, 800 A.2d at 45.
74. Id. at 734, 800 A.2d at 45.
75. Id. at 736, 800 A.2d at 46.
76. Id. at 740, 800 A.2d at 48.
77. 381 Md. 348, 849 A.2d 487 (2004).
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advisements during his first appearance in court.78 At that time, he
was grouped with other defendants and shown an "Advisement of
Rights" videotape, containing a judge's recitation of each section (a)
advisement. 79 After viewing the video, the defendants were brought
before a bail review judge who examined each defendant's case indi-
vidually.8 ° In processing Richardson's case, the judge did not ask
whether he watched the video, understood it, or had questions about
it.8 Over the next three months, the defendant appeared in court
without counsel three times, which led the trial judge to declare a
waiver by inaction.82 After a trial conviction, the defendant appealed,
arguing that the video advisements were insufficient to allow him to
make a knowing and intelligent waiver.83 The Court of Special Ap-
peals ordered a remand, which Richardson appealed, and the Court
of Appeals granted certiorari.84
The Court of Appeals recognized that the videotape contained
every advisement required by the letter of Rule 4-215(a).85 The court
nevertheless vacated the waiver determination, finding that the mere
showing of a video does not ensure the defendant's comprehension of
those rights.86 The court held that a trial judge must ensure that the
defendant understands the mandatory advisements and the record re-
flects such an understanding.87 To be valid, therefore, videotaped or
en masse advisements must be supplemented with a "personal interro-
gation" by a judge to verify that the defendant understood the advise-
ments. 88 Because Richardson received no such interrogation, the
court concluded that the record did not unequivocally support a find-
ing of waiver by inaction. 89
78. See id. at 368, 849 A.2d at 499.
79. Id. at 351, 849 A.2d at 489; Brief for Petitioner at 7, Richardson v. State, 381 Md.
348, 849 A.2d 487 (2004) (No. 41).
80. Richardson, 381 Md. at 354, 849 A.2d at 490.
81. See id. at 354, 849 A.2d at 491.
82. Id. at 355-60, 849 A.2d at 491-94.
83. Id. at 350, 849 A.2d at 488-89.
84. Id. at 360-61, 849 A.2d at 494-95.
85. See id. at 368-69, 849 A.2d at 499 ("[T]he requirement that each defendant be ad-
vised pursuant to rule 4-215 (a) was discharged by showing a videotape of ajudge giving the
required advice ....").
86. Id. at 376, 849 A.2d at 503.
87. Id. at 369, 849 A.2d at 499.
88. Id, at 371, 849 A.2d at 500.
89. Id. at 376, 849 A.2d at 503.
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C. A Waiver Inquiry Lets Defendants Give a "Meritorious Reason "for
Appearing Unrepresented
After the court provides the mandatory advisements, Rule 4-215
requires it to conduct a waiver inquiry.9" Section (c) governs this in-
quiry in district court while section (d) applies in circuit court.9 ' Most
waiver determinations precede a jury trial and hence are in circuit
court. This Comment will consequently focus on section (d).92 That
section provides that if a defendant appears at trial without counsel,
but nonetheless expresses a desire for representation, "the court shall
permit the defendant to explain the appearance without counsel."9 3
If the court determines that this explanation is "meritorious," it shall
postpone the trial; otherwise, it may declare a waiver of counsel by
inaction and proceed to trial.94
Rule 4-215(d) is mandatory,9 5 and noncompliance constitutes re-
versible error.9 6 Unlike section (a), this section does not require the
inquiry to be conducted in any particular form.9 7 At minimum, how-
ever, a court must allow the defendant to explain an appearance with-
out counsel and consider whether this explanation is "meritorious."9 8
Maus v. State99 involved the failure of a trial judge to ask the defendant
why he appeared unrepresented. 10 0 The defendant in that case ap-
peared for his probation hearing without counsel three times. 1 '
When this happened a fourth time, the judge declared a waiver by
inaction without asking the defendant for an explanation.'0 2 The
court then proceeded with the hearing, which predictably resulted in
the revocation of the defendant's probation.' The Court of Special
Appeals affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed, admonishing
90. MD. R. 4-215(c) & (d).
91. Id.
92. Subsection (c) is nearly identical in language and application except that it sets
additional conditions for a district court to meet before proceeding to trial. MD. R. 4-
215(c). To wit, a district court may declare a waiver by inaction and proceed to trial only if
the defendant either is charged with an offense not punishable by a fine exceeding five
hundred dollars or imprisonment, or appeared before ajudicial officer of the district court
pursuant to Rule 4-213(a). Id.
93. MD. R. 4-215(d).
94. Id.
95. Williams v. State, 321 Md. 266, 271, 582 A.2d 803, 805 (1990).
96. Moore v. State, 331 Md. 179, 185, 626 A.2d 968, 971 (1993).
97. Id, at 187, 626 A.2d at 972.
98. MD. R. 4-215(d); Moore, 331 Md. at 185, 626 A.2d at 971.
99. 311 Md. 85, 532 A.2d 1066 (1987).
100. Id. at 113, 532 A.2d at 1080.
101. Id. at 109-10, 532 A.2d at 1078-79.
102. Id. at 110-11, 532 A.2d at 1079.
103. Id.
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that it is not enough for a trial judge to allow a defendant an opportu-
nity to explain an unrepresented appearance before declaring a
waiver; he must ask the defendant for such an explanation.'0 4
Once a court asks a defendant to explain an appearance without
counsel, it must consider whether the explanation is meritorious. 10 5
What constitutes a meritorious reason remains purposely unde-
fined.1"6 The Court of Appeals recognizes, however, a rebuttable pre-
sumption against waivers.10 7 Additionally, the Court of Special
Appeals has indicated, albeit in dicta, that the public defender's de-
nial of a proper request for assistance constitutes a meritorious reason
for appearing unrepresented.1 0 8
Regardless of merit, a court's consideration of a defendant's ex-
planation for appearing unrepresented must be more than "cur-
sory.''° In Moore v. State,"0 the trial judge asked the defendant why
he failed to obtain counsel during the two months between his arrest
and trial."' The defendant claimed that he could not finish paying
his lawyer's fee and did not qualify for a public defender because his
income was too high."' Without additional inquiry, the court
deemed that the defendant waived counsel by inaction." 3 The Court
of Appeals reversed, however, because the defendant's explanation
may have been meritorious, but the trial judge failed to verify it. 14
The Moore court identified scenarios where further inquiry may have
allowed a court to distinguish between a reason that is meritorious
and one that is not.'15 For instance, the failure to pay one's lawyer, by
itself, is not a meritorious reason. 16 If, however, recent unemploy-
ment rather than neglect produced such an outcome, that would
104. Id. at 95, 113, 532 A.2d at 1071, 1080.
105. MD. R. 4-215(d). Maryland Rule 4-215(c), which applies to the district court, is
similarly constructed. MD. R. 4-215(c).
106. See Crowder v. State, 305 Md. 654, 657, 506 A.2d 240, 241 (1986) (stating that no
useful purpose would be served by deciding waiver cases based on decisions by other courts
and that waiver decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis).
107. Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 443, 735 A.2d 1003, 1015 (1999) (citing State v.
Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 264-66, 347 A.2d 219, 224 (1975)).
108. Moreland v. State, 68 Md. App. 78, 85, 510 A.2d 261, 264 (1986).
109. Johnson, 355 Md. at 446, 735 A.2d at 1017; see also Berry v. State, 41 Md. App. 563,
566, 389 A.2d 59, 61 (1979) (stating that "cursory questioning" during a waiver inquiry is
invalid), rev'd on other grounds, 287 Md. 491, 413 A.2d 557 (1980).
110. 331 Md. 179, 626 A.2d 968 (1993).
111. Id. at 181-82, 626 A.2d at 969.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 182, 626 A.2d at 969.
114. Id. at 186-87, 626 A.2d at 971.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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make the reason meritorious. 117 Similarly, a defendant has a facially
meritorious reason for appearing without counsel if she could not af-
ford a private attorney and the public defender refused to represent
her. i t ' This reason becomes invalid if the defendant could pay her
attorney but did not, or she had a reasonable opportunity to apply for
a public defender but made no good faith effort to do so." 9
The extent to which a court must undertake further inquiry into
a defendant's lack of counsel was addressed again in Gray v. State. 2 '
The Gray court held that if a defendant's explanation is "facially meri-
torious," further inquiry is required.'2 1 During the waiver inquiry in
Gray, the defendant explained that he thought he could afford a pri-
vate attorney but was ultimately unable to do SO. 1 22 Then, he applied
for a public defender, but missed the deadline.' 2  The trial court de-
clared a waiver by inaction because the judge believed that two
months was enough time for the defendant to determine whether he
could hire private counsel or whether he needed to apply for a public
defender.' 2 4 The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that a waiver by
inaction presupposes a neglect or refusal to obtain counsel125 and
finding that the judge erred in failing to conduct a further inquiry
into the defendant's facially meritorious reason for appearing without
counsel.1 26 The court noted that the record did not reflect the extent
to which the defendant tried to obtain private counsel because the
court did not conduct a further inquiry into the matter.
1 27
A similar situation occurred in Blackston v. Blackston.t21 In that
case, the defendant's explanation for appearing without counsel was
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 338 Md. 106, 656 A.2d 766 (1995).
121. Id. at 112, 114, 656 A.2d at 769, 770.
122. Id. at 110, 656 A.2d at 768.
123. Id. at 109, 656 A.2d at 767. The public defender requires an indigent defendant to
apply ten working days before trial. Id. at 109 n.2, 656 A.2d at 767 n.2.
124. Id. at 110, 656 A.2d at 768.
125. Id. at 112, 656 A.2d at 769.
126. Id. at 114, 656 A.2d at 770.
127. Id. at 113, 656 A.2d at 769.
128. 145 Md. App. 348, 802 A.2d 1124 (2002). Blackston does not directly involve Mary-
land Rule 4-215. The defendant in that case was found in contempt of court for failing to
pay child support. Id. at 351, 802 A.2d at 1125. A contemnor can be incarcerated follow-
ing a hearing, and he is therefore entitled to be represented by counsel. MD. R. 15-206(e).
As in criminal cases, however, a contemnor can waive counsel by inaction pursuant to
Maryland Rule 15-206(e). The Blackston court applied case law on Maryland Rule 4-215
because "Maryland Rule 15-206(e) is, in substance, identical to rule 4-215(d)." Blackston,
145 Md. App. at 358, 802 A.2d at 1129.
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that his reported income from the previous year made him ineligible
for a public defender, but his current finances did not allow him to
retain private counsel. 29 The trial court did not consider this a meri-
torious reason and declared a waiver by inaction.13 ° The Court of
Special Appeals reversed, reasoning that the trial judge should have
questioned the defendant about his finances before deciding whether
his explanation was meritorious. 13
1
The Court of Appeals in Moreland v. State also stated that the trial
court is responsible for preserving on the record the factual justifica-
tion for the waiver. 132 The defendant in that case appeared for trial
unrepresented three times before the judge conducted a waiver in-
quiry.131 When asked to explain the absence of counsel, the defen-
dant claimed that the public defender rejected his application for
exceeding the income threshold.134 Without further inquiry, the trial
judge declared a waiver of counsel by inaction, presumably because he
found the explanation to be without merit.1' The Court of Special
Appeals disagreed because the record suggested two mutually exclu-
sive scenarios of equal probability that explained why the defendant
had no counsel.'1 6 The defendant could have failed to make a good
faith effort to apply for a public defender. 137 Or, the defendant could
have made a timely request that was rejected. 138 Because the law re-
quires a waiver to be supported unequivocally by the record, the More-
land court vacated the judgment.139
Since Rule 4-215 was amended in 1986,14° in only one instance, in
Felder v. State, has a trial court's waiver of counsel by inaction been
ultimately upheld on appeal.' 41 The defendant in that case was given
the mandatory advisements at his initial court appearance. 4 2 Three
weeks later, he appeared at trial without counsel and requested a post-
ponement.143 The judge granted his request after reiterating the
129. Blackston, 145 Md. App. at 351-52, 802 A.2d at 1126.
130. Id. at 353, 802 A.2d at 1126.
131. Id. at 358, 802 A.2d at 1130.
132. 68 Md. App. 78, 81, 510 A.2d 261, 262 (1986).
133. Id. at 79-80, 510 A.2d at 261-62.
134. Id. at 80, 510 A.2d at 262.
135. Id. at 80-81, 510 A.2d at 262.
136. Id. at 83-84, 510 A.2d at 263-64.
137. Id. at 84, 510 A.2d at 263.
138. Id., 510 A.2d at 263-64.
139. Id, at 84, 510 A.2d at 264.
140. Maryland Rule 4-215 was amended on April 7, 1986. MD. R. 4-215.
141. 106 Md. App. 642, 666 A.2d 872 (1995).
142. l at 645-46, 666 A.2d at 873.
143. Id at 646, 666 A.2d at 874.
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mandatory advisements and recommending that the defendant apply
for a pubic defender that day. 14 4 One month later the defendant ap-
peared without counsel for the third time. 145 When asked to explain
the absence of counsel, the defendant explained that his family tried
to hire private counsel but ultimately failed to do SO. 14 6 Consequently,
when he applied to the public defender's office, they rejected him
because it was within ten days of trial.147 The defendant acknowl-
edged, however, that he did not apply for a public defender after the
postponement when the judge specifically advised him to do so.' 48
Based on these circumstances, the trial judge rejected his explanation
as nonmeritorious and declared a waiver of counsel.14 The defen-
dant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion; he did not specifically allege, however, the misapplication
of Rule 4-215.15 The Felder court therefore held that there was no
abuse of discretion because the trial judge complied with Rule 4-
215.151
D. Maryland's Waiver of Counsel by Inaction as Currently Applied
In sum, the following two-step process is required to apply Mary-
land's rule on waiver of counsel by inaction.152 First, a trial court must
dispense the mandatory advisements pursuant to section (a) .15  This
section demands strict compliance. 15 4 Ajudge-and no other-must
personally dispense each and every mandatory advisement point-by-
point at one time. 155 If the court provides the mandatory advisements
through a video or en masse, a judge must personally interrogate the
defendant afterwards to verify that the advisements were under-
stood. 156 The second step of the waiver process is the waiver in-
quiry. 157 During this inquiry, the trial judge must ask the defendant
for an explanation for appearing unrepresented and carefully con-
144. Id
145. Id. at 647, 666 A.2d at 874.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 650, 666 A.2d at 876.
151. Id. at 651, 666 A.2d at 876.
152. MD. R. 4-215.
153. MD. R. 4-215(a).
154. Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 280, 523 A.2d 597, 607 (1987).
155. Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 461, 735 A.2d 1003, 1025 (1999).
156. Richardson v. State, 381 Md. 348, 371, 849 A.2d 487, 500 (2004).
157. MD. R. 4-215(c) & (d).
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sider whether the reason given is meritorious.1"8 The court must in-
dulge every reasonable presumption against a waiver, which means
that a facially meritorious reason necessitates further inquiry. 15' A
judge can only declare a waiver by inaction when the record unequivo-
cally supports the conclusion that the defendant neglected or refused
to obtain counsel. 160
III. ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals demands strict compliance with Rule 4-215
to promote three goals: simplicity of procedure, fairness in adminis-
tration, and the protection of a defendant's fundamental rights.' 6 '
Regrettably, these goals have not been fully realized. The waiver pro-
cess is complex and inefficient because appellate courts frequently
change the way Rule 4-215 is applied, either by construing it narrowly
or implying from it unfounded procedural requirements. They often
do so to reverse seemingly valid waiver determinations where justice
was served and the spirit of the law, if not its letter, was upheld. Conse-
quently, trial judges are unsure whether they are properly administer-
ing the waiver procedure or committing an error that will spawn a new
rule. The waiver process is unfair because appellate courts routinely
elevate form over substance to reverse a finding of waiver where a de-
fendant's rights have not been violated. Such formalism is unneces-
sary because a defendant's fundamental right to counsel can be
protected by a less rigid construction of the law. The Court of Ap-
peals can balance fairness and procedural efficiency by relaxing the
doctrine of strict compliance or, alternatively, adhering to the current
construction of the rule, and only creating new requirements when
absolutely necessary to avert structural injustice.
A. Constantly Modifying Rule 4-215 Does Not Promote Simplicity
in Procedure
The Court of Appeals strictly enforces Rule 4-215 in part to pro-
mote simplicity in procedure.' 62 The present waiver process seems
simple and straightforward when neatly summarized in an academic
158. MD. R. 4-215(d). Aside from the two mandatory components, a waiver inquiry is
not required to follow a particular form. Moore v. State, 331 Md. 179, 187, 626 A.2d 968,
972 (1993).
159. Gray v. State, 338 Md. 106, 112, 114, 656 A.2d 766, 769, 770 (1995).
160. Moreland v. State, 68 Md. App. 78, 84, 510 A.2d 261, 264 (1986).
161. Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 280, 523 A.2d 597, 607 (1987).
162. Id. at 281, 523 A.2d at 607.
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article. 6 3 Yet, despite the abundance of defendants who refuse or
neglect to actively seek representation, only once has an appellate
court upheld such a waiver.1 64 This suggests that Rule 4-215, while
simple in the abstract, is difficult to apply. Difficulties arise largely
because appellate courts continually change the way the rule is ap-
plied. Such frequent modification breeds error rather than promot-
ing procedural simplicity because it confuses trial courts about the
proper process.
Reviewing courts have changed the way Rule 4-215 is applied in at
least two ways. First, they have construed the rule narrowly to require
statutory elements to be followed in a particular manner that is hardly
self-evident from the statutory text. For instance, section (a) instructs
that "[a]t the defendant's first appearance in court without coun-
sel . . . the court shall [provide the mandatory advisements]."165 The
Johnson court read this to mean that only ajudge-and no other-can
dispense the section (a) advisements.16 6 The Webb court narrowed
this interpretation even further, and required the mandatory advise-
ments to come literally straight from the judge's mouth. 67 Appellate
courts also have narrowly interpreted the text of section (d). That
section states that in conducting a waiver inquiry "the court shall per-
mit the defendant to explain the appearance without counsel."' 6 8 The
Maus court construed this to mean that a trial court should not merely
allow a defendant to explain an appearance without counsel upon re-
quest; rather, the judge must actually inquire of the defendant why
she has no counsel.
169
The second way in which appellate courts have modified Rule 4-
215 is by implying new procedural requirements beyond the plain lan-
guage of the statute.1 7 ° In interpreting section (a), for example, the
Johnson court held that, to be valid, all five mandatory advisements
must be given "point-by-point" at one time. 7 ' This interpretation,
while reasonable, is neither explicitly commanded nor manifestly im-
plicit. Indeed, an opposite interpretation is equally reasonable be-
163. See supra notes 152-160 and accompanying text (summarizing the waiver process).
164. See Felder v. State, 106 Md. App. 642, 666 A.2d 872 (1995).
165. MD. R. 4-215(a) (emphasis added).
166. Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 455, 461, 735 A.2d 1003, 1022, 1025 (1999).
167. Webb v. State, 144 Md. App. 729, 740, 800 A.2d 42, 48 (2002). This rule presumably
applies to videotaped advisements as well, but it has not been tested since ajudge narrated
the video in Richardson. Richardson v. State, 381 Md. 348, 352, 849 A.2d 487, 489 (2004).
168. MD. R. 4-215(d) (emphasis added).
169. Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 113, 532 A.2d 1066, 1080 (1987).
170. This seems anathema to the courts' strict construction of Rule 4-215, but appellate
courts have neither acknowledged nor explained this inconsistency.
171. Johnson, 355 Md. at 461, 735 A.2d at 1025.
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cause the statute suggests that the mandatory advisements may be
given by a court over several appearances. Indeed, Rule 4-215(a)
states that the court shall provide the mandatory advisements if "the
record does not disclose prior compliance with this section by a
judge."172 This suggests that judges may provide the advisements that
their predecessors omitted. Another procedural requirement implied
from section (a) is the Richardson rule, which requires judges to inter-
rogate defendants to determine if they understood the mandatory ad-
visements given via video or en masse. 7 ' The text of the rule specifies
no such verification procedure. 174 Appellate courts also have en-
grafted procedural requirements onto the section (d) waiver inquiry.
The Gray court obligated trial judges to conduct a "further inquiry"
into a defendant's "facially meritorious" reason for appearing unrep-
resented. 175 Additionally, the Moreland court burdened trial judges
with establishing an evidentiary record that unequivocally supports
the waiver determination.176 Neither of these requirements is in the
rule. 17
7
These judicially devised procedural requirements do not pro-
mote procedural simplicity because appellate courts create them to
overturn seemingly proper waiver determinations. In Moore, for in-
stance, the district court arguably complied with every element of
Rule 4-215 then existing.1 78 The Court of Appeals nevertheless invali-
dated its waiver determination because the trial judge failed to make a
"further inquiry" into the merits of the defendant's excuse for appear-
ing without counsel.17 ' The rule does not mandate a further in-
quiry,' 80 and the court had not before required such an inquisition. 81
A similar fate befell the trial court in Moreland. The trial judge in that
case properly dispensed the mandatory advisements, but his ruling
was nevertheless vacated because the record did not "unequivocally
support" the waiver. 82 The burden of proving a meritorious reason
172. MD. R. 4-215(a).
173. Richardson, 381 Md. at 371, 849 A.2d at 500.
174. See MD. R. 4-215(a).
175. Gray v. State, 338 Md. 106, 112, 114, 656 A.2d 766, 769, 770 (1995).
176. Moreland v. State, 68 Md. App. 78, 84, 510 A.2d 261, 264 (1986).
177. See MD. R. 4-215(d).
178. Moore v. State, 331 Md. 179, 186-87, 626 A.2d 968, 971-72 (1993) (holding that the
situation, rather than the text of the law, obligated the court to conduct a further inquiry).
179. Id. at 186-87, 626 A.2d at 971.
180. See MD. R. 4-215(d).
181. See Moore, 331 Md. at 186-87, 626 A.2d at 971-72 (citing no precedent to require a
further inquiry).
182. Moreland v. State, 68 Md. App. 78, 84, 510 A.2d 261, 264 (1986).
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for appearing without counsel is not specified by the rule. 18 3 Indeed,
the text suggests that the onus is on the defendant since section (d)
requires her to give a meritorious reason to avert a waiver by inac-
tion.' 84 That notwithstanding, the Moreland court burdened trial
judges to establish on the record that the defendant did not have a
meritorious reason for appearing without counsel. 185
The waiver procedure is additionally complex because judicially
created requirements are often vague. For example, Gray requires
that if a defendant provides a "facially meritorious" reason for appear-
ing without counsel, a judge must conduct a "further inquiry" into its
validity.' 86 The Court of Appeals, however, does not explain how ex-
tensive such an inquiry must be. Using the Moore court's hypothetical
to illustrate this point, a defendant has a facially meritorious reason
for appearing without counsel if she could not afford a private attor-
ney and the public defender refused to represent her.187 Appellate
courts have not explained to what degree of certainty this explanation
must be proven,188 nor have they indicated the specific kind of evi-
dence required to verify such a claim.189 The same is true for the
Moreland court's requirement that a waiver determination be unequiv-
ocally supported by the record. 9 ° Similarly, Richardson requires trial
judges to verify that a defendant understood the mandatory advise-
ments given via video or en masse.' 9 ' The Richardson court, however,
does not explain how comprehensively a defendant must demonstrate
her understanding of the advisements. Case law does not indicate
whether a judge may simply ask the defendant whether she under-
stood the advisements and be satisfied with an affirmative response.
The lack of precedent affirming waivers of counsel by inaction
leaves trial courts with no insight as to the situations in which waivers
by inaction may be valid, and, even worse, gives courts the impression
that waiver by inaction is effectively never valid. Indeed, the one case
where a waiver was upheld, Felder, carries almost no precedential
183. See MD. R. 4-215(d).
184. Id.
185. Moreland, 68 Md. App. at 84, 510 A.2d at 264.
186. Gray v. State, 338 Md. 106, 112, 114, 656 A.2d 766, 769, 770 (1995).
187. Moore v. State, 331 Md. 179, 186-87, 626 A.2d 968, 971 (1993).
188. Maryland appellate courts have not indicated whether a meritorious reason must
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
189. There is no indication as to what kind of documentary evidence, e.g., tax returns,
affidavits from the public defender explaining their rejection of the defendant, suffices to
support a finding that the defendant has a meritorious reason.
190. Moreland, 68 Md. App. at 84, 510 A.2d at 264.
191. Richardson v. State, 381 Md. 348, 371, 849 A.2d 487, 500 (2004).
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weight.' 9 2 The defendant in that case appeared unrepresented at his
first trial date, so the judge strongly advised him to apply immediately
for a public defender. 193 When he appeared without counsel for trial
a month later, the court deemed that he waived counsel by inac-
tion.194 To appeal his conviction, the defendant did not challenge the
court's application of Rule 4-215; rather, he alleged abuse of discre-
tion by the trial judge.195 Consequently, the Felder court's commen-
tary on the proper application of the rule is dicta. The dearth of
waiver determinations squarely upheld on appeal is problematic as it
evinces an unwritten judicial policy to veto legislation. Every time an
appellate court has construed the controlling statute, it has restricted
a trial judge's discretion to declare a waiver by inaction. 196 Indeed,
the Court of Appeals has upheld every narrow interpretation of Rule
4-215 and reversed any lower court attempt to relax the waiver pro-
cess. t9 7 Should this trend continue, and there is no evidence to indi-
cate otherwise, the rule will be construed so narrowly that it will
become a dead letter.
B. Elevating Form over Substance Results in the Unfair Administration of
Rule 4-215
Maryland appellate courts also justify their strict enforcement of
Rule 4-215 as a means to ensure fairness in administration.' 9 8 Con-
trary to this goal, the doctrine of strict compliance has created a
waiver procedure that is unfair, as appellate courts routinely elevate
form over substance. 9 9 That is, reviewing courts reverse waiver deter-
192. Felder v. State, 106 Md. App. 642, 666 A.2d 872 (1995).
193. Id. at 646, 666 A.2d at 874.
194. Id. at 647, 666 A.2d at 874.
195. Id. at 650, 666 A.2d at 876.
196. See, e.g.,Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 461, 735 A.2d 1003, 1025 (1999) (requiring
a trial judge to give the mandatory advisement point-by-point at one time); Moore v. State,
331 Md. 179, 186-87, 626 A.2d 968, 971 (1993) (requiring the court to conduct a further
inquiry if the defendant gives a facially meritorious reason for appearing unrepresented);
Moreland v. State, 68 Md. App. 78, 84, 510 A.2d 261, 264 (1986) (requiring that a waiver
determination be unequivocally supported by the record); Berry v. State, 41 Md. App. 563,
566, 389 A.2d 59, 61 (1979) (requiring a waiver inquiry to be more than cursory), rev'd on
other grounds, 287 Md. 491, 413 A.2d 557 (1980).
197. The Court of Appeals has specifically declined to sanction a harmless error analysis
at least four times. See Johnson, 355 Md. at 446-49, 464, 735 A.2d at 1017-19, 1027 (citing
and affirming Okon v. State, 346 Md. 249, 696 A.2d 441 (1997), Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407,
663 A.2d 593 (1995), and Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 523 A.2d 597 (1987), all of which
rejected a harmless error analysis).
198. Parren, 309 Md. at 281, 523 A.2d at 607.
199. See id. at 282, 523 A.2d at 607 (noting the State's argument that allowing the de-
fendants to claim that their voluntary discharge of appointed counsel was based on a mis-
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minations, not because of substantive injustice, but because the trial
court departed from the prescribed form of the waiver procedure.
The Johnson court, for instance, reversed a waiver determination be-
cause a court commissioner, rather than a judge, gave the defendant
the mandatory advisements. 200 The court did not consider whether
the defendant understood the advisements or whether a general pol-
icy of having commissioners provide them will result in defendants
better understanding their trial rights. The court invalidated the
waiver because Rule 4-215 requires "the court" to provide the
mandatory advisements, 20 1 and a court commissioner is not "the
court. 20 2 The formalistic approach employed by the appellate courts
is even more apparent in Webb. The trial judge in that case went
through the mandatory advisements with the defendant point-by-
point, during a hearing on the record. 0 3 Instead of personally in-
forming the defendant of the possible penalties, however, the judge
instructed the state's attorney to read the charges aloud in court.20 4
The state's attorney's statements were made under the direction and
authority of the trial judge. The Webb court nevertheless deemed this
a violation of the rule and, ipso facto, reversible error.20 5 In both John-
son and Webb, the trial courts achieved the purpose of the law. 206 They
informed the defendants of the rights and processes necessary for
them to make informed decisions about their respective legal
predicaments. 207
Another way that appellate courts elevate form over substance in
applying Rule 4-215 is by valuing constructive knowledge over actual
knowledge. Under well-established principles in both property law20 8
understanding of the law that would "exalt form over substance and would not serve the
ends of justice").
200. Johnson, 355 Md. at 455, 735 A.2d at 1022.
201. MD. R. 4-215(a).
202. Johnson, 355 Md. at 455, 735 A.2d at 1022.
203. See Webb v. State, 144 Md. App. 729, 734, 800 A.2d 42, 44-45 (2002).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 740, 800 A.2d at 48.
206. See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text (summarizing Johnson and Webb).
207. See supra notes 59-62, 68-74 and accompanying text (showing how the defendant in
Johnson was given the mandatory advisements, albeit by a court commissioner, while the
defendant in Webb was warned about the possible penalties of a conviction, albeit by the
state prosecutor).
208. A subsequent purchaser is indisputably subject to an equitable servitude if she has
actual knowledge of it. GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 663-64 (2d ed.
2002). She may be subject to such a servitude if it is "apparent from the appearance of the
property." Id. at 644. It is undisputed that bona fide purchasers are not protected from
recording acts if they have actual notice of the prior conveyance. Id, at 1003-30. However,
there is ongoing dispute over the sufficiency of constructive notice. Id.
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and civil procedure, 209 actual knowledge trumps constructive knowl-
edge, the latter being but a fictional substitute for the former. Under
Maryland's case law on waiver of counsel by inaction, however, con-
structive knowledge is more important than actual knowledge. For
example, Rule 4-215(a) (3) requires the court to advise the defendant
of the nature of the charges and their allowable penalties.210 The trial
judges in both Parren and Moten failed to do so, partly because there
was clear and convincing evidence on the record that the defendants
actually knew the relevant punishments. 21 During a pretrial proceed-
ing, the defendant in Parren cited the specific statutory provision that
212enatiMtn
contains the punishment for his crime. The defendant in Moten
had been recently convicted of the identical charged crime, and he
confirmed on the record that he understood the penal consequences
of a conviction. 2 " The trial courts in both Parren and Moten clearly
achieved the spirit of the law, if not its letter, yet the Court of Appeals
nevertheless vacated their respective judgments because they did not
provide the defendants with constructive notice.2 1 4
Elevating form over substance burdens the court system and de-
lays justice to incoming criminal defendants. As with any other proce-
dural rule, Rule 4-215 seeks to provide defendants with a fair process
that is sufficiently expeditious so as not to deny justice to other de-
fendants.21' The legislature intended for the rule to deter defendants
from refusing to obtain counsel or failing to make an effort to do so.
Unfortunately, the strict application of Rule 4-215 does not deter de-
fendants from refusing counsel, but allows defendants to use the rule
as a tactical mechanism to delay trial and as grounds for appeal. The
strict application of the rule also burdens the court system because
trial judges are repeatedly postponing cases where the defendant's
own conduct caused the delay. For example, the defendant in Johnson
made seven unrepresented appearances. 216 Similarly, the defendant
in Moreland occupied the court system for nine months despite an eas-
209. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1950) (re-
quiring personal service of written notice of major changes in a trust over newspaper publi-
cation whenever possible).
210. MD. R. 4-215(a) (3).
211. Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407, 408-09, 663 A.2d 593, 594-95 (1995); Parren v. State,
309 Md. 260, 276, 523 A.2d 597, 605 (1987).
212. Paren, 309 Md. at 276, 523 A.2d at 605.
213. Moten, 339 Md. at 408-09, 663 A.2d at 594-95.
214. Id. at 409, 663 A.2d at 595; Paren, 309 Md. at 280, 523 A.2d at 607.
215. SeeJohnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 452, 735 A.2d 1003, 1020 (1999) ("[I]n addition
to serving as a protective measure for the accused, Rule 4-215 also serves judicial economy
and efficiency by preventing excessive and costly appeals.").
216. Id. at 454, 735 A.2d at 1021.
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ily dispensable case.2 1 7 Of course, it took much longer to process
Moreland's case fully because a waiver determination reversed on ap-
peal is almost always remanded back for retrial.2 1 1
C. Fundamental Rights Can Be Protected Without Sacrificing
Procedural Efficiency
Another reason that appellate courts strictly enforce Rule 4-215 is
to protect a criminal defendant's fundamental rights.219 As intended
by the rule, no defendant has in effect been unjustly deprived of the
right to counsel due to inaction; but this is largely because waiver de-
terminations are almost never upheld on appeal.22 This suggests that
courts prefer to sacrifice judicial economy to protect a defendant's
fundamental rights. Such a tradeoff is unnecessary, however, because
a less stringent standard of review can both protect a defendant's
rights and promote procedural efficiency. In many cases discussed
above, the defendants would not have been deprived of their funda-
mental rights had the appellate courts affirmed rather than reversed
their waiver determinations. The defendants in Parren and Moten, for
instance, knowingly and intelligently waived their right to counsel by
inaction.22 The same can be said of the defendant in Johnson, who
appeared in court without counsel seven times over the course of nine
months before a judge finally declared a waiver of counsel by inac-
tion.222 During that period, he was repeatedly reminded of his right
to counsel and the obligations associated with it, but he did noth-
ing.223 The Webb case was reversed solely on a semantic technicality
because the judge had the state's attorney read the charges rather
than doing it himself.224
These cases were reversed primarily because the court believes
that a Manichean application of the rule will promote simplicity in
procedure and fairness in administration. 2 Given that these ends
217. Moreland v. State, 68 Md. App. 78, 79-80, 510 A.2d 261, 261-62 (1986).
218. See Mitchell v. State, 337 Md. 509, 516, 654 A.2d 1309, 1313 (1995) ("Without ex-
ception, we have ordered a new trial in cases involving a trial court's failure to comply with
Rule 4-215(d).").
219. Parren, 309 Md. at 281, 523 A.2d at 607.
220. Felder v. State is the only instance where a trial court's waiver of counsel by inaction
has been ultimately upheld on appeal. 106 Md. App. 642, 666 A.2d 872 (1995).
221. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
222. Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 454, 735 A.2d 1003, 1021 (1999).
223. Id at 434, 735 A.2d at 1011.
224. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
225. See Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 282, 523 A.2d 597, 608 (1987) (absolving trial
courts of even minor procedural violations "would enhance complexity rather than secure
1396 [VOL. 64:1376
2005] MARYLAND'S RULE ON WAIVER OF COUNSEL BY INACTION 1397
have not been achieved by the chosen means,226 it may be better for
the court to relax the rigid construction of the rule.227 Specifically,
the Court of Appeals should reconsider adopting a "substantial com-
pliance"/"harmless error" standard based on "unequivocal support"
on the record. Under such a standard, a trial court must substantially
comply with the rule, and any procedural error will not be reversed if
it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.228 Concomitantly, the re-
cord must unequivocally support any waiver-by-inaction determina-
tion.229 Such a policy would eliminate hypertechnical scrutiny of a
trial court's findings and avoid the reversal of truly trivial procedural
oversights that do not affect the trial. Of course, such a proposal
would not bar appellate courts from reversing flagrant abuse of judi-
cial discretion. Should this be too radical a departure from prece-
dent, then at the very least there is no need to make the procedure to
waive counsel by inaction any stricter. Indeed, appellate courts should
stop construing the statutory language more narrowly and creating
new procedural requirements beyond those specified under the rule.
Lastly, to promote a truly fair and simple waiver process, the Court of
Appeals should affirm the next properly administered waiver of coun-
sel by inaction to create a template for lower courts to follow.
2 °
IV. CONCLUSION
Maryland provides counsel at state expense to criminal defend-
ants who cannot afford a lawyer. It is incumbent upon such defend-
ants, however, to make a good faith effort to obtain a public defender;
otherwise, they may forfeit the right to counsel by inaction. Maryland
Rule 4-215 specifies the process that advises defendants of their legal
rights and obligations so that any waiver of the right to counsel is
done knowingly and intelligently. This rule seeks to create a proce-
dure that is fair and efficient: one that preserves an individual's funda-
simplicity in procedure, tend to unfairness rather than fairness in administration, and ...
promote rather than eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay").
226. See supra notes 162-218 and accompanying text.
227. See Johnson, 355 Md. at 446-49, 464, 735 A.2d at 1018-19, 1027 (citing Okon v. State,
346 Md. 249, 696 A.2d 441 (1997), Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407, 663 A.2d 593 (1995), and
Parren, 309 Md. 260, 523 A.2d 597, in order to reject the State's recommendation that it
adopt a harmless error analysis).
228. See Johnson, 355 Md. at 425-26, 735 A.2d at 1006 (noting the State's position that the
trial court properly found the defendant waived his right to counsel where there was sub-
stantial compliance with the rule).
229. Moreland v. State, 68 Md. App. 78, 84, 510 A.2d 261, 264 (1986).
230. See Felder v. State, 106 Md. App. 642, 650, 666 A.2d 872, 876 (1995) (determining
that there was no failure of compliance with the rule, yet raising a question as to the wide-
spread applicability of the decision).
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mental rights but also dispenses justice swiftly. Regrettably,
Maryland's appellate courts have exalted the former at the unneces-
sary expense of the latter. They have done so by requiring strict com-
pliance with the rule, a policy that has proven counterproductive
because it has resulted in a waiver process that is difficult to apply,
unfair, and unnecessarily formalistic. Appellate courts can craft a fair
and efficient waiver process by either easing the strict construction of
Rule 4-215 or, alternatively, avoiding further unnecessary procedural
engraftments.
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